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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3564
___________
DAVID ALBERT BONIELLA,
                                                      Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
___________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-01314)
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Robert C. Mitchell 
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 14, 2010
Before:  RENDELL, HARDIMAN AND ALDISERT, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 16, 2010)
___________
 OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
The appellant, David Albert Boniella, appeals from the District Court’s order
affirming a determination of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration that
     Neither Boniella nor a representative appeared at the hearing.  1
2
he is not entitled to disability benefits.  We will affirm the order of the District Court.
I.
In May 2005, Boniella filed an application for supplemental security income (SSI)
benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381–1383, claiming
that he was unable to work because he suffered from depression, fatigue, and mild
chronic pain.  At the hearing on his application, the ALJ heard testimony from a
vocational expert who opined that an individual in Boniella’s position could perform
work as long as it did not demand more than simple, routine tasks, more than occasional
contact with coworkers, or any contact with the public.   The ALJ also considered several1
psychological evaluations and medical reports, including reports from Kathleen Shirley,
M.Ed., Boniella’s treating therapist; Debra Sharp Molchan, M.S., a psychologist who
performed a consultative examination at the state’s request; and Henry Weeks, Ph.D., a
state agency psychologist who provided an assessment of Boniella’s residual functional
capacity.     
After the hearing, the ALJ determined that Boniella was able to perform a
significant number of jobs in the economy despite his impairments.  Therefore, the judge
concluded that he was not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social Security Act, and
denied relief.  The Appeals Council subsequently denied Boniella’s request for review,
rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. 
3Boniella then filed a complaint in the District Court seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision.  Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The District
Court determined that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence and, by
order entered August 24, 2009, granted the Commissioner’s motion and denied
Boniella’s.  This appeal followed.   
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28
U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to determining
whether it is supported by substantial evidence.  Poulos v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d
88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007).  Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable
amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Id. (citation omitted).
To establish a disability under the Social Security Act, a claimant must show an
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months.”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).  A claimant is considered to be under a disability
“only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is
not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and
work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy. . . .”  Id. at § 423(d)(2)(A).  
4The Social Security Administration has promulgated regulations prescribing a
five-step sequential process for evaluating whether a claimant is disabled.  20 C.F.R. §
404.1520.  We have described this process as follows:
In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant is
currently engaging in substantial gainful activity.  20 C.F.R. §
[404].1520(a).  If a claimant is found to be engaged in substantial activity,
the disability claim will be denied.  Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140,
107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987).  In step two, the Commissioner
must determine whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant fails to show that her impairments
are “severe,” she is ineligible for disability benefits.
In step three, the Commissioner compares the medical evidence of
the claimant’s impairment to a list of impairments presumed severe enough
to preclude any gainful work.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  If a claimant does
not suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds
to steps four and five.  Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether the
claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant
work.  20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).  The claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating an inability to return to her past relevant work.  Adorno v.
Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1994).
If the claimant is unable to resume her former occupation, the
evaluation moves to the final step.  At this stage, the burden of production
shifts to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant is capable
of performing other available work in order to deny a claim of disability. 
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).  The ALJ must show there are other jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy which the claimant can
perform, consistent with her medical impairments, age, education, past
work experience, and residual functional capacity.  The ALJ must analyze
the cumulative effect of all the claimant’s impairments in determining
whether she is capable of performing work and is not disabled.  See 20
C.F.R. § 404.1523.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 428 (3d Cir. 1999).
5In this case, the ALJ began at step one of the analysis and found that Boniella had
not been gainfully employed since September 30, 2001, the alleged onset date of his
disability.  Next, the ALJ found that, although Boniella’s mood and antisocial personality
disorders were “severe impairments,” they did not meet the criteria of those impairments
presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful work.  The ALJ then assessed Boniella’s
residual functional capacity, and found that, although he did not retain the capacity to
perform his past computer-related work, there were many unskilled entry-level jobs that
he could perform.  Specifically, the ALJ found that:
[Boniella] has the residual functional capacity to perform work at any
exertional level that does [not] require: more than simple routine,
repetitious tasks, with one- or two-step instructions; or strict production
quotas, defined as the requirement to produce a specified number of units of
work in a specified period of time; or more than occasional contact with
coworkers or supervisors; or any contact with the public. 
(AR 16.)  Upon review, the District Court concluded that the ALJ’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence.  
We have reviewed the administrative record and agree with the District Court that
the ALJ’s decision was based on substantial evidence.  Therefore, we will adopt its
reasoning.  The ALJ properly weighed the relevant evidence and properly conducted the
five-step sequential evaluation to reach its decision.  See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d
34, 42 (3d Cir. 2001).  As the District Court explained, the ALJ’s assessment of
Boniella’s residual functional capacity was consistent with the evidence presented at the
hearing, including Dr. Weeks’s assessment form and explanatory findings, and the
6treatment summary and statement of Boniella’s treating therapist, Kathleen Shirley.  The
ALJ’s conclusion was also consistent with the vocational expert’s findings.  To the extent
that Boniella argues that the ALJ failed to give proper weight to Ms. Molchan’s opinion
that he was temporarily disabled, we note that the ALJ properly considered Ms.
Molchan’s opinion along with all of the other medical evidence, and properly concluded
that her opinion was not entitled to controlling weight.  (AR 16–17.)  See Wright v.
Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 683 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that a statement by a treating
physician that a claimant is disabled or unable to work is not dispositive; rather, an ALJ
must weigh the relative worth of a treating physician’s report against the other medical
evidence).   
We have considered Boniella’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that
they are without merit.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  To the
extent that Boniella’s “statements to the Court regarding urgency” are construed as
motions for expedited disposition of his appeal, the motions are denied. 
